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Abstract
Three Essays on International Trade and Labor Market Flexibility
Shadrack Mwilaria
Differences in labor laws and regulations are believed to have profound effects on the
flow of jobs and workers within and across industries. The speed of these flows conse-
quently influence global trade patterns, either negatively or positively. Many countries
are reluctant to change existing regulations in their labor market as well as regulations
on trade because they believe such changes would have negative implication on their
export industries and jobs. This dissertation consists of three essays that look at these
issues by examining how labor institutions interact with industry-level factors and their
effects on export specialization, trade barriers and employment.
In the first chapter, I examine the type of global specialization patterns that arise as a
result of the advantage generated by the flexibility of labor in a country. In particular, I
use country-industry pooled data to examine the relationship between industry-specific
volatility, labor market flexibility and export specialization. I find that interactions
between labor flexibility, industry-specific volatility and industry-level capital intensity
play an important role in determining the structure of global export specialization. The
second chapter shows that in addition to various industry-level factors that influence pro-
tectionism, interactions between labor institutions and industry-specific volatility par-
tially explain changes in tariff levels across industries and countries. Using industry-level
data across many countries, and employing the political-economy theory of endogenous-
trade protection, I show that industry-specific volatility partially explain average tariffs
across industries and countries. The third chapter provides evidence that trade policies
effect jobs across less developed countries. Reducing trade barriers lowers unemploy-
ment among unskilled workers but increases unemployment for skilled workers. These
two effects cancel each other, such that trade policies do not seem to have any effects on
the overall unemployment across less developed countries.
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Chapter 1
STRUCTURE OF INDUSTRIAL SPECIALIZATION, VOLATILITY AND
LABOR MARKET FLEXIBILITY
1.1. Introduction
The inexorable growth of world trade since the end of World War II generated enor-
mous impetus towards understanding trade patterns and the underlying determinants of
these patterns. To date, economists have assembled a rich theory that explains the struc-
ture of international trade and trade patterns that arise with increasing international ex-
change. The theory emphasizes differences in production capabilities due to technology,
factor composition, firm heterogeneity, product differentiation and economies of scale.
Alongside this mainstream theory of international trade, there is an emerging realization
that institutions such as labor market flexibility, labor laws and regulations, property
rights and other institutional structures influence patterns of international trade (Chor,
2010; Cunat and Melitz, 2009; Costinot, 2009; Levchenko, 2007; and Nunn, 2007). Em-
pirical evidence, particularly on the role of labor market institutions in the determination
of trade patterns, is limited. Theory suggests that labor flexibility confers comparative
advantage. However, the linkages between flexibility of the labor market and industry
characteristics such as, industry-specific volatility are not well understood. There is no
consensus flexibility determines international export specialization and trade patterns.
The main objective of this paper is to empirically examine how flexibility of labor
market influences exports specialization via interactions with industry level character-
istics. I use an empirical model that is motivated, in part, by two theoretical models.
The first model, due to Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), shows that flexibility of the labor
market confers comparative advantage to the flexible economy, whereby a large share of
export comes from differentiated industries. The second model, attributed to Cunat and
Melitz (2009), asserts that flexibility of the labor market course comparative advantage
for the flexible economy, whereby a large share of export comes from volatile industries.
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The two models affirm that labor market rigidity and flexibility course comparative ad-
vantages. However, the nature of specialization in the production that is coursed by
the flexibility and rigidity of the labor market is not clear. Do flexibility of the labor
market influence specialization in production towards volatile industries as indicated by
Cunat and Melitz model? Or is the specialization towards capital-intensive industries
or is it towards differentiated industries as Helpman and Itskhoki claims? An empirical
study is necessary to tease out these issuing theoretical assertions in order to have a
deeper insight on the linkages between labor flexibility and specialization of production.
There are limited empirical and theoretical models that examine the links between labor
market rigidity and flexibility, and trade patterns. Although many reasons could ex-
plain this state of literature, lack of good measures of labor market institutions and the
correlation between labor institutions and production capabilities across countries are
potential reasons why there are few studies that examine the role of labor institutions
in the determination of trade patterns. For example, countries with better technologies
and higher factor productivities tend to have better institutional structures. Such cor-
relations could create a challenge for an empirical study that intends to examine the
relationship between labor market institutions and the structure of international trade.
However, there are indices that capture differences of labor market institutions across
countries that are not necessarily correlated with countries income.
Botero et al. (2004) constructs indices that capture labor market rigidities fairly
well and these indices show significant variation even across developed economies where
production capabilities are significantly identical. I use three of these indices, Cost of
adjusting hours worked index, Cost of firing workers index and dismissal regulations
index to constructed a proxy measure of labor flexibility. 1
1The labor flexibility measure is an average of all the three indices. A high value, (see rigidity of labor
values reported on table 1) as constructed by Botero et al. (2004), indicate high rigidity of labor. I
therefore, convert these values to capture increasing flexibility of labor by subtracting from 1, because
the highest possible value is 1, such that, a high value indicates low cost and thus more flexibility.
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The labor rigidity index reported on table 1 is an average of the three indices and it
does not indicate any correlation with income across countries. Figures 1, 2 and 3 show
insignificant correlation across for both developed and less developed.
1.2. Flexibility of the Labor Market
Botero, Djankov, La Porta, Lpez de Silanes and Shleifer (2004) have developed sev-
eral indices to measure various labor regulations across many countries, both developed
and less developed countries. I use three of those indices to developed a measure of
labor flexibility and then examine how flexibility influences the structure of industrial
specialization across many countries. The index capturing flexibility of labor is the av-
erage of; index capturing cost of adjusting hours worked, index capturing cost of firing
workers, and an index for dismissal laws. These indices are constructed such that higher
values corresponds to less flexibility, that is, higher resistance to the flow of workers. In
estimating these indices BDLLS assumes a representative firm and worker, with some
standard characteristics, in order to enable comparison across countries. 2
1.2.1. Cost of adjusting hours worked: The cost of adjusting hours worked, is
estimated using the maximum number of regular hours a representative employee works
per year in each country. According to the estimates by the authors, these hours range
from 1,758 in Denmark to 2,418 in Kenya. It is then assumed firms aim to increase hours
worked from 1,758 to a maximum of 2,418 hours per year. For each firm, worked hours
are increased to the countrys maximum, then the firm start adding overtime hours. In
the case where, for example overtime hours are capped, such that employees cannot
2The representative worker is a full-time employee, who is not an executive and has worked for 20 years in
the same firm. His salary plus benefits, during the whole period of employment, amount to the countrys
GNP per worker. He has two children and the spouse only takes care of household cores with no other
formal employment. This worker is a citizen of the country and belongs to the predominant race and
religion/belief of the majority. The household resides in the most populous city in the country. The
worker cannot be a member of labor union, unless the law makes it a mandatory requirement, and he
retires at the age stipulated by the law. On the other hand the representative firm is a manufacturing
firm that is fully owned by the citizens of the country and is located in the most populous city. It has
250 regular employees and it abides by all the stipulated laws and regulations but does not offer workers
benefits and responsibilities other than those stated in the law. Vacations, holidays and overtime hours
are excluded.
3
accumulate worked hours to 2, 418 for the entire year, it is assumed the firm would
double it workforce and pays each worker 1,758 hours. This also doubles the wage bill of
the firm. The cost of adjusting hours worked is then estimated as the ratio of the final
wage bill to the initial one.
1.2.2. Cost of firing workers: This variable captures the cost of firing 20 percent of
the firms workers. Of the 20 percent, 10 percent are fired because they are redundant
while the other 10 percent there is no reason given for firing. The cost of firing a worker
includes the payments the firm makes before dismissing the worker. These include sev-
erance payment, and other mandatory penalties established by law or through collective
bargain for a worker with three years of tenure with the firm. For illegal firing of a
worker, the cost of firing is estimated as the annual wage of the worker. The new wage
bill for the firm is the sum of the regular wage bill for the remaining workers plus the
additional payments for dismissal. The cost of firing is then the ratio of the new wage
bill to the initial wage bill.
1.2.3. Dismissal regulations: To capture dismissal regulations, BDLLS generates a
variable that uses the average of seven binary variables. First, a dummy capturing a
case whereby the firm is required to inform a third party before it can fire more than one
worker. Second, a variable denoting a situation whereby the firm must get approval from
a third party before it can dismiss more than one employee. A third dummy variable
represents a requirement that the firm must notify a third party before a redundant
worker is dismissed. A forth variable denotes the case whereby the firm must get approval
from a third party in order to dismiss a redundant worker. The fifth variable captures
the case whereby the firm must provide relocation or retraining alternatives prior to
dismissal. The sixth dummy variable is equal to one if there are priority laws applying
to dismissal or layoffs. Finally, the seventh binary variable captures priority regulations
applying to reemployment. The employment index reported on Table 1, developed by
Botero et al. (2004) based on the above described criteria, is used for empirical estimation
in this paper to capture the flexibility of the labor market.
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1.2.4. Limitations of the labor flexibility index: This measure of labor flexibility
is limited in that it cannot capture many factors that influence labor mobility within and
between industries in a country. It assumes that the ease of reallocating labor within
industries is mainly dependent on the costs associated with hiring, firing and adjustment
in hours worked. For example a firm may have an incentive to retain highly productive
workers by paying them higher wages regardless of the costs imposed in the labor market
through various regulations and laws. The efficiency wage model, attributed to Shapiro
and Stiglitz (1984) , is a classic example that articulates the factors that motivate firms to
pay wages above the market clearing wages. The labor index, however, has it’s strength
as a labor institution measure because it does indicate high correlation with income as
is usually the case with many country-level measures of type of institutions.
1.3. Export specialization patterns
Understanding the existing variations in export specialization patterns and how the
nature of the labor market contributes to these specialization structures is vital for
international trade policy, especially for countries that may want to expand and diver-
sify exports. Export specialization patterns vary significantly across countries but the
underlying factors that influence these patterns are not well understood. For exam-
ple, according to Giovanni and Levchenko (2011) middle-income countries exports are
highly concentrated in volatile industries while advanced countries exports are mainly in
medium-risk sectors and fairly diversified. The authors find that among countries with
safest export structures are some of the poorest and least diversified countries contrary
to the notion that low-income countries tend to specialize in risky sectors such as mining
and metals. Understanding the main determinants of these specialization patterns is the
core purpose for this study.
The main contribution of this paper is to provide empirical evidence on how labor flex-
ibility interacts with industry specific characteristics to influence export specialization.
In particular, do countries whose labor markets are relatively flexible tend to specialize
5
towards industries that exhibit high intrinsic volatility as suggested by theory? How
does the structure of export specialization relate to differences in labor market flexi-
bility across countries? This paper examines these questions using industry-level data
for many countries and building upon the implications from the models by Cunat and
Melitz (2009), and Helpman and Itshoki (2010).
1.4. Theoretical framework
The theory of comparative advantage suggests that countries will specialize towards
their comparative advantage industries. I propose that if this specialization happens,
then relatively flexible economies should specialize towards industries that exhibit high
idiosyncratic volatility while rigid economies should specialize in relatively less volatile in-
dustries. Relatively flexible economies also tend to specialize away from capital-intensive
industries because these industries do not benefit from rapid flow of workers across in-
dustries. This paper sheds light on these predictions by revealing that flexibility of the
labor market influences export specialization away from industries exhibiting high in-
trinsic volatility and away from capital-intensive industries. Following Cunat and Melitz
(2009), I present a conceptual framework that guides the empirical examination of the
above hypothesis. I consider two countries, F and R, with two different institutional
scenarios, a flexible labor market and rigid one. In each country there are L units of
labor, which is not mobile across countries. The supply of labor is inelastic for any
non-negative wage. Each country has a representative agent who consumes a continuum
of finals goods whose consumption index is Q. Consumer preferences are assumed to be
identical across countries. Agents maximize utility over a Cobb-Douglas aggregate Q of
a continuum of final goods.
Q ≡ exp
{∫ 1
0
lnq(j)dj
}
(1)
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where q(j) represents consumption of final good j. It requires a continuum of intermedi-
ate goods represented by Z to produce the final good in each industry. The production
function for each final good is therefore denoted as follows.
y(j) =
[∫ 1
0
y(j, z)
α−1
α dz
] α
α−1
(2)
The above production function captures industrys technology in the production of a
final good j. The consumption function, equation (1), and production function, equa-
tion (2), of the final good are denoted differently to emphasize that each industry is
distinct in its production technology, represented by (2), within the country. Consumers
however, consume a continuum of final goods across all industries. Industries produc-
tion technologies vary within the country but not across the two countries. The term
y(j), equation (2) above, denotes production technology of industry j. Equation (2) also
indicates that the final good in each industry is produced from a C.E.S. continuum of
intermediate goods. The parameter α is greater than one, it captures elasticity of sub-
stitution between intermediate goods that are used to produce final goods. Labor is the
only factor used in the production of each intermediate good, the production function
is denoted by the following equation.
y(j, z) = epiL(j, z) (3)
where pi is a stochastic term, and within each industry pi’s are assumed to be random
draws from a common distribution Φj(.). These pi’s are independently identically dis-
tributed (iid) with a variance σ2(j) , and vary across industries but are identical across
countries. The variance σ2(j) captures the volatility of the industry j. This construc-
tion of volatility accentuates shocks to the intermediate goods producers. The termpi ,
after it is realized, uniquely identifies the intermediate good producer z. It is therefore
convenient to usepi as the index that represents intermediate goods.
In the flexible economy, F , markets are competitive with market forces of demand
and supply determining the prices. The resources in this economy are allocated after
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the realization of pi. The competitive nature of the flexible economy underscores the
view that resources are easily reallocated towards their more efficient use at negligible
cost.
In the rigid economy, markets exhibit less degree of competitiveness that characterize
the flexible economy. In particular, wage wR is negotiated before the producer of in-
termediate goods can hire the workers. For example, labor unions could negotiate with
the intermediate good producers and set a wage acceptable by both parties. The costs
of adjusting labor and wage prohibit the firm from any adjustments after the workers
have been hired. Essentially, producers of intermediate goods commit themselves to the
costs of labor before the realization of pi. This market scenario emphasizes a view that
rigidities limits the firms from adjusting labor costs in response to changing market con-
ditions. The rigidity of the labor market also ensures that intermediate good producers
must pay all hired workers the agreed wage regardless of the realization of pi. Moreover,
in this labor market set up, changes in unemployment cannot pull down the economy-
wide predetermined wage. The product and commodity market clears, subject to labor
and wage constraints, in a competitive setting after pi has been realized.
In the flexible economy, without trade (autarky), profit maximization in the produc-
tion of final goods leads to zero-profit condition denoted by the following equation.
PF (j) =
[∫ ∞
−∞
pF (j, pi)
1−αdΦj(pi)
] 1
1−α
(4)
Profit maximization by intermediate good producer also ensures zero-profit condition.
This leads to the following equation:
PF (j, pi) = e
−piwF (5)
where wF represents the equilibrium wage that is determined competitively before the
realization of the shock. As mentioned earlier pi is used to index for intermediate goods
since the productivity draw is specific to the intermediate good producer. Equations (4)
and (5) yield the following expression:
8
PF (j) = wF
 1[∫∞
−∞ e
pi(α−1)dΦj(pi)
] 1
α−1
 (6)
The denominator term in equation (6) captures productivity level in industry j. This
productivity level is a weighted average of the productivity levels of the intermediate
good producers epi. It should also be noted that the weights relate to the intermediate
goods cost share in the final good production. For the flexible economy, the productivity
level of industry j (the denominator term in equation (6)), can be written as follows:
θF (j) =
[∫ ∞
−∞
epi(α−1)dΦj(pi)
] 1
α−1
(7)
Given the zero-profit conditions, both the market for final goods and for the factor of
production for these final goods clears in this flexible economy before trade takes place
(autarky condition).
Turning to autarky conditions in the rigid economy, the firms maximize expected
profit subject to input constraints. All firms in industry j are assumed to be identical
before the realization of pi. The zero-profit condition for the production of final good j
imply that the price of the final good is equal to the cost of producing one unit. This is
represented as follows:
PR(j) =
[∫ ∞
−∞
PR(j, pi)
1−αdΦj(pi)
] 1
1−α
(8)
The zero-profit condition for the intermediate good producer implies that labor cost
is equal to the expected revenue. This is represented as follows:
wRLR(j) =
∫ ∞
−∞
PR(j, pi)yR(j, pi)dΦj(pi) (9)
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where wR captures the wage in the rigid economy. The market for intermediate goods
then clears. This market clearing condition is captured by the following equation:
epiLR(j) =
[
PR(j, pi)
PR(j)
]−α
yR(j) (10)
Equations (8), (9) and (10), (capturing the zero profit conditions in the production of the
final goods, intermediate good producer and the market clearing condition respectively)
leads to the following equation:
PR(j) = wR
 1[∫∞
−∞ e
pi α−1
α dΦj(pi)
] α
α−1
 (11)
As in the case for the flexible economy, let the denominator of equation (11) be
represented as follows:
θR(j) =
[∫ ∞
∞
epi
α−1
α dΦj(pi)
] α
α−1
(12)
Equation (12) captures the productivity level in industry j for the rigid country. As
noted above the two productivity levels, (7) and (12) are derived from autarky, zero-profit
and market clearing conditions. In both economies productivity is a weighted average
of productivity levels of the intermediate good producers. The distribution of these in-
termediate good productivity levels are the same in both countries, however, for each
industry j, the productivity averages are different as the cost shares of the intermediate
goods in the final good production vary across the two countries. Producers of final good
in the flexible economy benefit from dispersion of productivity levels among intermediate
good producers because they are able to efficiently shift their expenditures towards low
priced intermediate goods. Efficient reallocation process is absent in the rigid economy
as a result of existing barriers to flow of labor, which gives the flexible economy abso-
lute advantage across all industries. Productivity levels can be represented using the
following inequality, θR(j) ≤ θF (j) for all j. Whenever ΦR(j) is non-degenerate (and
there are idiosyncratic productivity shocks) then θR(j) < θF (j). The preceding analysis
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is simplified by assuming normal distribution of productivity draws, a ranking of indus-
tries based on increasing volatility such that; standard deviation σ(j) is increasing in j,
and is differentiable and non-negative. Given these assumptions, industry productivity
level in the flexible economy is presented as follows:
θF (j) = exp
{
(α− 1)σ
2(j)
2
}
(13)
Under the same assumptions of normal distribution, the average industry productivity
level for the rigid economy is presented as follows:
θR(j) = exp
{
α− 1
α
σ2(j)
2
}
(14)
Equation (13) and (14) represents average industry productivity levels for the flexible
and rigid countries respectively under autarky: Consider now that the two economies
are open for trade. Given that final goods are traded and intermediate goods cannot be
traded between the countries, then equation (13) and (14) can be used to define relative
productivity level in the sense described by Dornbusch et al. (1977) as follows:
θR(j)
θF (j)
= exp
{
−σ2(j)(α− 1)
2
2α
}
(15)
Let X(j) ≡ θR(j)θF (j) represent productivity differential, from equation (15) above. Then
the case that X(j) ≤ 1 is consistent with the fact that labor market flexibility confers
absolute advantage to the flexible economy. In addition labor market institutions interact
with industry volatility to generate a pattern of Ricardian type comparative advantage.
It is the case that when there are no shocks, differences in labor market flexibility
are irrelevant because there is then no source of comparative advantage, no motive for
trade and no specialization. However, in the presence of firm-level shocks, the flexible
economy can reallocate labor across firms more easily leading to increased productivity
across industries relative to the rigid economy.
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1.5. Industry-Specific Volatility
Empirical literature on trade openness and volatility has mainly focused on identi-
fying the sources of macroeconomic volatility and establishing the relationship between
volatility, trade openness and economic developments. For example, Koren and Ten-
reyro (2007) find that countries with relatively large share of production concentrated
in industries that exhibit high intrinsic volatility tend to experience higher aggregate
volatility, which substantially impacts macroeconomic variables. Other empirical stud-
ies on volatility and trade (See Easterly et al 2001, Imbs 2007, Laursen and Mahajan
2005, and Giovanni and Levchenko 2009) examine the effects of overall volatility of the
aggregate output growth on various macroeconomic variables.
In particular, Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) argue that overall trade relates to over-
all volatility via the variance of each industry, σ2j , the covariance properties between
industries,σjk or through the production structure of the economy, aj . The authors
estimate aggregate volatility as follows:
σ2A =
∑
j
a2jσ
2
j +
∑
j
∑
k 6=j
ajakσjk (16)
An important focus, in this paper, is to estimate values that capture industry-specific
shocks. These values are then used to proxy for the industry-specific volatility vari-
able. Following Giovanni and Levchenko (2011), I estimate industry-specific shock using
industry-level value added. Note that the aggregate volatility is not the variable of in-
terest, as the case in Giovanni and Levchenko, but one of the components that form the
aggregate country volatility, the global industry-specific shock. This is the component
of the shock that is specific to the industry, which I estimate using the deviations in
growth rate of value added. Letting gcut to denote deviation to growth in value added
in country c, industry j and at time t, then the global industry-specific shock, vjt is
estimated as the cross-country average of gcjt in each of the industries.
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Table 3 indicates values of standard deviation and variance, estimated by Giovanni
and Levchenko (2011), which are used to proxy for global industry-specific shock. These
values suggest that the most volatile industries are mining, petroleum and coal products,
and non-ferrous metals. While food products, beverages, wearing apparel, and machinery
electrical are the least volatile. The values estimated by the authors may differ from
those I estimated on table 4. The fact that Giovanni and Levchenko use a different
data set for a different time period and industry-level value added per worker could
explain the variation of their estimation from those in table 4. Value-added per worker
is normally stable and thus may not capture industry-specific volatility effectively.
In my estimation I use year differenced log of value added. Annual industry-level
value added is used and not value added per worker used by Koren and Tenreyro (2007),
and Giovanni and Levchenko (2011). A complete description on how volatility variable
is constructed in this paper is presented under subsection 5.2.
In the Cunat and Melitz model volatility is high if the industry has large share of
volatile firms. Essentially industry volatility, in the Cunat and Melitz model, is derived
from firm-level volatility. Volatility of the industry would be captured better by estimat-
ing the volatility of the firms that form the industry, however its practically challenging
task because firm-level data are rarely available across many industries and countries.
1.6. Empirical Strategy and Data
To examine the pattern of specialization I use a dataset compiled by Nicita and Olar-
reaga (2006) on trade and production. The dataset covers the period 1990 to 2002 for
most industries and countries. This dataset is disaggregated into 28 manufacturing in-
dustries across 68 countries. It includes annual data on trade flows (exports and imports)
and production variables such as employment, output and value-added. The data are
averaged over the period 1990-2002 to smooth out fluctuations. Exports (value of export
adjusted to international constant prices) are used to estimate revealed comparative ad-
vantage (RCA) values for all industries across countries. RCA values are used to capture
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export specialization. Higher values of RCA indicate a higher degree of specialization
in that industry. Industry-level RCA is used as the response variable. Explanatory
variables of interest are industry-specific volatility and labor market flexibility.
To measure labor market flexibility across countries I use rigidity of employment index,
which is an average of three indices (cost of hiring index, cost of firing and rigidity of
work hours) developed by Botero et al. (2004). This index captures important cross-
country differences in the flow of workers and jobs across occupations. It also captures
differences in the flow of workers in and out of employment. The most recent data on
rigidity of employment index is from World Bank Development Indicators website for
the year 2008 and 2009. It is assumed labor market flexibility is institutional in nature
(capturing differences in labor market institutions across countries), and according to
North (1991) institutions are sticky, meaning they only change very gradually over many
years. The view by North that institutions change very gradually over several decades
supports my use of these most recent data on rigidity of employment even though other
variable in this empirical analysis span over 1990 to 2002.
In addition to the main variables of interest namely, measure of export specialization,
measure of industry volatility and measure of flexibility, I include an interactions control
variable that potentially influence structure of specialization. The interaction between
industry level capital-intensity and capital-abundance may potentially influence export
specialization. Capital intensity for each industry is calculated as the gross fixed capital
formation divided by the number of employees in the industry. And capital abundance for
each country is calculated as countrys gross fixed capital formation divided by the total
adult population. Country-level data are obtained from the World Bank Development
Indicators website and the Penn World Tables (PTW 7.0) while industry-level variables
are obtained from the Nicita and Olarreaga (2006) Trade Protection and Production
dataset available on the World Banks website.
1.6.1. Industry Specialization. Trade economists have rested on a less disputed view
that comparative advantage is an important determinant of the commodity composition
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of trade. As a result of this overriding importance of the principle of comparative advan-
tage in international trade theory, use of empirical measures of comparative advantage is
necessary in empirical studies that attempt to understand the pattern of goods imported
and exported. Economists develop realistic indices that are based on observed variables
to conjecture what would be the form of autarky relative prices. These indices are used
in practical work to measure the structure of specialization. For this study revealed
comparative advantage (RCA) values are calculated, using real value of exports at in-
dustry level, to infer export specialization. RCA values vary across industries within the
country and also across countries.
I use the value of exports to estimate RCA for all 28 manufacturing industries across
68 countries. To smooth out any annual fluctuations, exports are averaged over the
period 1990-2002. Comparative advantage formulation, attributed to Balassa (1965) is
used to estimate revealed comparative advantage for all manufacturing industries across
all the countries as follows:
RCAcj =
xjc/
∑
j x
j
c∑
c x
j
c/
∑
c
∑
j x
j
c
(17)
where xjc denotes the value of export, superscript j denotes industry and subscript c
represents country. The term,
∑
c x
j
c, denotes the sum of export for industry j across all
countries in the sample, while
∑
j x
j
c represents the sum of export across industries. The
term,
∑
c
∑
j x
jc, denotes the global total value of export for all industries and countries
in the sample.
RCA value above unit suggests a country has a comparative advantage in that in-
dustry and thus specialize in that industry. When RCA value is below 1, it indicates
comparative disadvantage in that industry and thus specialization towards that indus-
try is muted. Moreover, RCA values in table 2 can be used to imply similarities among
industries in which a country has a revealed comparative advantage and thereby also in-
dicate the characteristics of a country that would give rise to its comparative advantage.
For example, it can be inferred that Austria specialize relatively more towards Wood
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and Cork products, Paper products, Furniture and Fixtures, Printing and Beverage in-
dustries among other industries. The Czech Republic specializes towards industries such
as, Tobacco, Textiles, Rubber products and fabricated metal among other industries.
1.6.2. Estimating industry-specific volatility. Volatility variable is constructed
using annual industry-level data on value added. If gcjt represents deviations, from the
average, of the value added in country c, industry j, and at time t, then the global
industry-specific volatility (vjt) is estimated as the cross-country average of gcjt in each
of the industries as shown in the following equation:
vjt =
1
C
C∑
c=1
(gcjt) (18)
The term, gcut, is estimated as the year-differenced log of industry-level value added,
which captures the standard deviation of the annual growth rate of industry value added.
The values reported on table 4 are vjt, averaged over the time period, for each indus-
try. These values indicates that tobacco, other chemical products other than industrial
chemicals, and plastic products are the most volatile manufacturing industries. The
least volatile industries are textile, industrial chemicals and transport. I use these values
to proxy for industry-level volatility. The interaction between this measure of indus-
try volatility and labor market flexibility play a role in the determination of export
specialization.
1.7. Empirical Model
The model specified, interacts industry-level and country level variables and controls
for industry and country fixed effects. The objective is to examine the partial effects of
these interactions on the degree of export specialization.
RCAcj = α0 + α1 (V OLj ∗ FLEXc) + α2 (Kcj ∗ FLEXc) + α3 (Kcj ∗Kc) + cj
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where RCAcj =
xjc/
∑
j x
j
c∑
c x
j
c/
∑
c
∑
j x
j
c
denotes a measure of the degree of export specialization.
Variable Xjc denotes the value of exports industry j in country c. Industry-level volatility
is captured by the term V OLj , and the flexibility of the labor market is denoted by
FLEXc. The variable Kcjdenotes industry-level capital intensity while Kc represents
country-level capital abundance.
The model predicts a positive estimated coefficient,α1, which imply that more flexibil-
ity of the labor market influences specialization towards more volatile industries. After
controlling for volatility across industries it is predicted the value of α2(estimated coeffi-
cient on the second interaction variable) would be negative, which means rigidity or less
flexibility of the labor market influences specialization towards capital-intensive indus-
tries. Estimated coefficient,α3, on the last interaction variable is expected to be positive,
which means increasing capital influences export specialization towards capital-intensive
industries. There are possible industry-specific factors and country-specific character-
istics that are likely to affect the structure of specialization, but are not captured by
explanatory variables in the model. The model therefore, controls for Industry and
country specific effects.
1.7.1. A Probit estimation: The response variable, RCA, in the model is first con-
structed as a continuous variable whereby increasing values capture an increasing degree
of specialization. The probit estimation is used in the second case whereby RCA variable
is constructed as a binary variable with ones and zeros. RCA values greater than or
equal to unit are replaced with ones and these capture comparative advantage industries.
The theory of comparative advantage assumes that countries tend to specialize towards
comparative advantage industries. On the other hand values below unit are converted
to zeros, these capture comparative disadvantage industries and countries tend not to
specialize toward these industries. Taking RCA values equal to or above unit to capture
comparative advantage industries and values below unit to capture comparative disad-
vantage industries is consistent with Balassas (1965) formulation of revealed comparative
advantage estimation.
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1.8. Results and Discussion
Estimated results from the empirical model are presented on tables 5 and 6. Column
2, on table 5, shows coefficient estimates and robust standard errors with industry fixed
effects. The estimated coefficient on the first interaction (V OL ∗FLEX) is statistically
significant and has positive sign. The positive sign implies that as the labor market
becomes more flexible, holding other factors constant, the country tends to specialize
towards industries that exhibit high volatility of value added. For example, 1 percent
change of labor flexibility increases the degree of specialization towards volatile industries
by about half of a percentage.
This empirical evidence indicates that a country could potentially expand it’s export
composition by making labor more flexible, for example by eliminating excessive labor
laws and regulations. This could enable a country to increase export in industries that
experience intrinsic volatility in value addition.
The estimated parameter on the second interaction variable (K ∗FLEX) has negative
sign and is statistically significant implying, after controlling for the effects of volatility,
flexibility of the labor market encourages specialization towards less capital intensive
industries.
As predicted by the model, the sign on the interaction variable Kcj ∗ Kc is positive
and significant. It is interpreted that, after controlling for flexibility and volatility, a
capital abundant country tends to specialize towards capital-intensive industries.
Table 6 presents results from probit estimation. In this estimation a negative re-
gression coefficient means that the explanatory variable increases the probability of the
outcome. In the case for the interaction between volatility and labor flexibility, the esti-
mated value is negative and statistically significant at one percent confidence level. This
means higher flexibility diminishes the probability that a country will specialize towards
industries exhibiting high intrinsic volatility. A large regression coefficient means the
explanatory variable strongly influences the probability of that outcome.
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1.9. Concluding Remarks
This study finds that the flexibility of the labor market influences the patterns and
structure of global trades. The flexibility of labor, in this study, is narrowly defined as
average costs of hiring, firing and ease of adjusting hours worked for a representative
employee in an industry. These costs are believed to influence the flow of labor within
and between industries. If these costs are low, labor can easily reallocate in the presence
of production or demand shocks.
A country whose labor market is more flexible tend to concentrate significant exports
in industries exhibiting high fluctuations in value added and industries that are less
capital-intensive. The main implication of the finding is that policies that influence
the flow of workers and jobs across industries could potentially affects the patterns and
structure of export specialization. For example, countries that intend to expand export
industries could benefit by implementing policies that make their labor markets more
flexible. These policies may include better employment contracts, reduced powers of
labor unions and other policies that minimize rigidities in the labor market.
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Chapter 2
Trade Protection and Industry-specific Volatility
2.1. Introduction
Global trade has increased significantly in the last half century. The conventional
view is that this trend is mainly attributed to systematic reductions in trade restrictions
during the same period. The gradual reduction of trade barriers has increased market
accessibility and integrated markets for goods, services and capital, but also created con-
cerns that the resulting openness propagates macroeconomic volatility. A burgeoning
body of literature that links openness to volatility of various macroeconomic variables
tends to insinuate that openness contributes to volatility. Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz
(2001) suggest a positive partial correlation between openness and growth volatility.
Rodrik (1997) argue that volatility in the labor market, volatility in hours worked and
earning, is correlated with openness. Kose, Prasad and Terrones (2003) find that open-
ness correlates with volatility of output growth. Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) find
that a measure of openness to international trade is positively associated with sector
volatility (measured by the log variance of the annual growth rate of output per worker
in the sector). Di Giovanni and Levchenko also assert that more trade in a sector mutes
aggregate output volatility. But openness creates specialization, which work to minimize
volatility. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundbald (2006) argue that openness of financial mar-
kets is negatively related to the consumption growth volatility. The links, between trade
openness and volatility, identified in the literature do not have solid theoretical founda-
tion; they are multifaceted views pointing to openness of the financial capital markets
and trade in goods and services as potential sources of macroeconomic volatility. There
is no clear consensus on the source of macroeconomic volatility, and the nature of the
relationship between trade openness and volatility of various macroeconomic variables is
not well understood, which leaves this relationship an open question subject to empirical
examination. This paper attempts to fill the existing gap by examining the link between
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trade barriers and industry-level volatility. I employ an elaborate theory of endogenous
trade-policy determination to develop and empirical model that explain the effects, on
trade barriers, of industry-level volatility and other industry-level factors. The empirical
model is based on the premise that openness to international trade arise from deliber-
ate actions taken by policymakers as they respond to the demands of special interest
groups (industries), who stands to gain from more or less open international markets.
On one hand, industries exhibiting high volatility demand protection from policymakers
thus limiting openness in these industries. Industry-level volatility therefore limits trade
openness if politicians provide demanded protection to these volatile industries. On the
other hand, industry-specific volatility interact with labor flexibility to generate some
form of comparative advantage in the country with flexible labor market. This is the
kind of comparative advantage explained by Grossman and Itskhoki (2010), and Cunat
and Melitz (2009). The effects on protection of these interactions are negative because
comparative advantage industries tend to demand less trade barriers leading to more
open international markets. These views are analyzed in this paper.
2.2. Determination of Trade Barriers
Recent decades have experienced unprecedented reductions in barriers to commodity
and commercial services trade across countries. Average tariff rates across countries are
lower than any other time in history and the gains, resulting from increases in cross bor-
der flow of goods, commercial services and capital due to lower barriers, are indisputable.
In part, coordinated international trade policies through bilateral and multilateral initia-
tives, usually guided by the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor, the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), are credited for this greater openness
to international trade. Despite these monumental changes in the global trading system
protectionism is still a global concern. Countries have maintained restrictive trade poli-
cies across industries that are considered politically important. Developed countries,
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such as United States, that have managed to lower average tariffs significantly main-
tain restrictive trade barriers, in form of subsidies, in the agricultural sector. Average
tariff rates across less developed countries are relatively high compared to the average
tariff rates in developed countries. As witnessed from the breakdown of the Doha trade
negotiations in the summer of 2010, the issue of protectionisms is as important today
as it was a few decades ago. For example, in recently years when many countries were
worried about declines in macroeconomic variables such as employment and real output,
the public debate seemed to favor protectionism.
Trade barriers are considered, for most part, detrimental to global economic devel-
opment. The premise behind this view is that barriers, such as tariffs, quotas, and
non-tariff barriers, course inefficiencies and reduced welfare because they distort prices.
Most economists subscribe to the view that trade barriers need to be eliminated because
a more open global economy, one without restrictions on the flow of goods and services,
is better for economic development. In reality however, almost every country imposes
some form of trade barriers and trade regulations that are meant to limit access to in-
ternational markets. What are the determinants of these industry-specific trade barriers
and regulations? Economists have proposed numerous models in an effort to answer this
question. For example, models by Krugman (1987), and Grossman and Helpman (1991)
articulate how tariffs could increase welfare when they target specific industries. The
authors show per capital gross domestic product could increase when tariffs or quotas
targets those industries that course externalities. Some existing trade barriers, in specific
industries, could be result of informed policies meant to maximize gains in those indus-
tries that course externalities. Other models such as protection for sale model due to
Grossman and Helpman suggest that trade barriers could be imposed, regardless of the
implication to the overall welfare, through a competitive political process where gains
concentrate on few organized special interest.
Theoretical models that explain how trade barriers and overall trade policies are
determined are extensive (see Gawande, 2003). However, empirical studies are limited.
22
The prevailing low average tariff rates across most developed countries could explain the
inertia towards empirical studies that relates to determinants of trade barriers and overall
trade policy. However, recent developments in the field of international trade seem to
change the state of empirical literature on trade policy. First, greater concentration, by
trade economists, on industry and firm level productivities to explain changing patterns
in international flow of goods and services has generated interest to understand the
structure of tariffs at industry level. A good example of this renewed focus on tariffs is
the work by Nunn and Trefler (2010). The authors assert that the structure of tariffs
across industries is important for economic policy because targeted tariffs influences long-
term economic growth. The second recent developed that seem to have renewed interest
in the study of trade barriers is the great recession of 2008-2009. Bown (2011) points the
collapse of trade flows during the 2008-2009 recession raised concerns on the possible re-
emergence of protectionist policies. The 2008-2009 great collapse in international trade
revived debates on temporary trade protection to mitigate the effects of the recession.
In the political and public discourse there is evidence of a renewed focus on trade
restriction. For example, Paul Krugman wrote on the New York Times in February
2009:
”The economic case against protectionism is that it distorts incentives:
each country produces goods in which it has comparative disadvantage,
and consumes too little of imported goods. And under normal conditions
that is the end of the story. But these are not normal conditions...”
It suffice to say that the changing global trading systems and the accruing knowledge
on the importance of firm and industry level production structures in the determination
of trade flows and patterns, emphasize the need for a deeper understanding, at industry
level, of the determinants of trade barriers.
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2.3. International Trade and Volatility
Di Giovanni and Levchenko (2009) present three linkages between aggregate volatility
and trade openness. The authors find a positive correlation between exposure to inter-
national trade and volatility of output growth at industry level. They also point out
that more trade in a sector, whose growth is less correlated with aggregate growth, de-
creases aggregate volatility. And finally, they assert that more trade in a country leads
to greater specialization, which could lead to increased volatility. These findings are
important steps towards answering a broader question on the sources of macroeconomic
volatility. However, they do not inform how industry specific-volatility could affects
openness via trade policies that target volatile industries. In addition, openness (com-
puted as exports plus imports divided by output) and volatility are positively related
for some industries and negative for other industries. Figure 1 indicates correlations of
openness and volatility at industry level. The industries are defined according to the
International industrial classification (ISIC). The scatter plots on the top row of figure
1, beginning from left, represents Tobacco manufactures and Manufacture of footwear,
except vulcanized rubber or plastic footwear. The bottom row, from left, represents
manufacture of mineral products and Manufacture of pottery, china and earthware. The
negative relationship between openness and volatility for all four industries could imply
that volatility of the industry reduces openness to trade. However, the scatter pots are
not sufficient to infer causality. Figure 2 denotes the scatter plots for tariffs and volatil-
ity. The upper panel, from top left, indicate positive correlation between tariffs and
volatility for three industries; Tobacco manufactures, Manufacture of paper and papers
products, and Manufacture of machinery and pottery. Lower panel show both positive
and negative relationships for other three industries. These findings farther justify a
need for through empirical analysis to understand the relationships between openness
to trade and volatility. The theory and empirical analysis under section 4 and 5 aims at
establishing the direction of causality between trade barriers (hindrances to openness)
and volatility.
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2.4. Theoretical Framework
Previous theoretical developments attempted to determine common economic and po-
litical determinants of trade barriers across countries and industries. Underlying these
theories is the notion that trade barriers could create inefficiencies and lower welfare of
a society. Therefore trade barriers are better explained by political motive rather than
economic efficiency motive. Although there are variations of theoretical models on the
determination of trade policy, a common view that emerges is that forces of demand and
supply determine equilibrium level of protection. Interest groups demand protection
by acting rationally (comparing marginal costs and benefits of lobbying for protection)
and politicians (policy-makers) supply this protection as they seek to maximize personal
objectives (self-interested objectives could include re-election among others). 1 The
idea of viewing political motives as the main determinants of trade policy is well ar-
ticulated by the ”protection-for-sale” model due to Grossman and Helpman (1994) and
its variations that are surveyed by Gawande and Krishna (2003). In particular, Gross-
man and Helpman model builds an elegant conceptual framework that over the years
has enabled economists to understand why we observe restrictive trade policies even
with the compelling arguments on the benefits of unrestricted trade. Since the model
of protection-for-sale is the most compelling recent theoretical foundation upon which
many other theories and empirical studies on endogenous trade policy are anchored,
I present a brief review of protection-for-sale model from Feenstra (2003, chapter 9,
pp.305-309).
Consider an economy with M goods and a numeraire export good. All M goods
and the numeraire good are additively separable in utility. Consumers maximize the
following quasi-linear utility function:
1The main contributions on the endogenous trade policy literature are by: Brock and Magee (1978);
Findlay and Wellisz (1982); Hilman (1982, 1989); Baldwin (1985); Magee, Brock and Young (1989);
Trefler (1993); Grossman and Helpman (1994); Helpman (1995); Lee and Swagel (1997)
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U =
M∑
j=1
uj(q
c
j) + q
c
0 (19)
where qcj denotes consumption of good j = 1, ...,M and the superscript c captures the
consumer. Consumers are equal to the number of workers, denoted by L, for the entire
economy. The term qc0 captures the consumption of numeraire export-good and the
indirect utility function of the individual consumer is given as follows:
υ(p, ωc) =
M∑
j=1
uj [dj(pj)]− p′d(p) + ωc (20)
where p denotes a vector of prices, ωc is the income of the consumer, dj(pj) represents
consumption in terms of the price. The first two terms on the right hand side of equation
(20), captures the consumer surplus. Let this consumer surplus per person be denoted
by following:
X(p) =
M∑
j=1
uj [dj(pj)]− p′d(p) (21)
From equation (20) and (21), the individual consumer welfare can be written as follows:
υc(p, ωc) = X(p) + ωc (22)
On the production side, production technology for each industry j = 1, ...,M is de-
noted by the following equation. yj = fj(Lj ,Kj) , where yj denotes the output, Lj is the
labor input and Kj represents the capital. The capital input is specific to the sector and
one unit of labor produces the numeraire commodity, which implies the wages are fixed
at unity. The profit gained from each additional unit of the specific input is denoted by
the following equation:
pij(pj) = max [pjfj(Lj ,Kj)− Lj ] (23)
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Optimal outputs are determined using the profit equation (5). In each industry the
optimal outputs are denoted by the following expression:
pi′j(pj) = yj(pj) (24)
Import industry receives a positive tariff τ on foreign good. The imports for each
good are given by the following equation:
zj(pj) = L [dj(pj)]− yj(pj) (25)
The revenue collected by the government from the imposed tariff is denoted by the
following equation:
R(p) =
M∑
j
zj(pj)
[
pj − p∗j
]
(26)
where R(p) represents tariff revenue, zj(pj) captures the imports and p
∗
j captures fixed
foreign price.
Assuming that a section of the population earns; returns (from the specific capital
they own in each industry), wages (from the unit labor they provide), share distributed
tariff revenue and consumer surplus, then welfare of owners of specific capital in industry
j is given as follows:
Ej(p) = pij(pj) +Aj [X(p) + 1] +
Aj
L
R(p), j = 1, ...,M. (27)
where Ej(p) represents the sum of welfare by the owners of specific capital in industry
j. The term Aj denotes the population that own specific capital. There are (L−A) ≥ 0
individuals who do not own capital but supplies labor. The term A =
∑M
j=1Aj represents
all individuals who own specific capital and L represents the total population. The
welfare of these individuals comes from the wages, consumer surplus and share of the
distributed tariff revenue. This welfare is give as follow:
E0(p) =
[
1− A
L
]
R(p) + (L−A) [1 +X(p)] (28)
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The total welfare is obtained by using equation (9) and (10), and summing them over
industries and the working population. The total welfare is represented by the following
expression:
E(p) = L [1 +X(p)] +R(p) +
M∑
j=0
Ej(p) +
M∑
j=1
pij(pj) (29)
Grossman and Helpman (1994) model (G-H model henceforth) assume that, some indus-
tries s ∈ S0 are organized lobbies, and s ∈ Su are unorganized lobbies. Each lobby aims
to influence trade policy through contributions to the electoral processes. The elected
policymakers (the government) formulate trade policy by weighing lobbies contributions
against the welfare of the society. They then impose tariffs that maximize the following
welfare function:
Q(p) = γEs(p) +
∑
s∈S0
Ds(p) (30)
where Ds(p) represents industries’ contribution plan for the electoral processes given the
price vector pj = p
∗
j + τj that they face in the market. In this case it is assumed that
expression (31) holds.
Ds(p) = max{0, Es(p)−Bs}, s ∈ S0 (31)
The G-H model assumes that the societies welfare (first term on the right hand side of
equation 12) is weighted by a positive weight γ . Following Bernheim and Whinston
(1986), the governments welfare function (equation, 30) can be written as follows:
Q(p) =
∑
s/∈S0
γEs(p) +
∑
s∈S0
[(1 + γ)Es(p)−Bs] (32)
Equation (14) represents a government welfare function that gives different weights to
the welfare of the organized lobbies from that of the unorganized lobbies. G-H model
shows that the link between the equilibrium tariffs and the underling determinants can be
established by maximizing (14). The steps required to solve the maximization problem,
involve taking derivatives of the welfare functions for the organized and unorganized in-
dustry, and for workers, and then computing first-order conditions. These steps gives the
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following equation for equilibrium tariffs as a function of the underlying determinants:
τs
ps
= −
(
ps
zs
∂zs
∂ps
)−1(ηs − λ
γ + λ
)(
ys
zs
)
(33)
where yszs represents the fraction of domestic production to imports, ηs is an indicator
variable that takes a value of one for organized industries s and zero otherwise, λ0 =∑
s∈S0
(
As
L
)
captures the fraction of the population that own a specific factor in an
organized industry. The G-H model precisely links the size of import tariffs to the ratio
of domestic production to import and the inverse of import demand elasticity. The
model provides, in part, an elaborate theoretical foundation upon which my empirical
analysis is anchored. Taking natural logs on equation (33) gives the following expression:
T = X1 +X2 +X3 (34)
where T denotes the natural log of
(
τs
ps
)
. The terms on the right hand side of equation
(16), X1, X2 and X3, respectively, represent ln
(
zs∂ps
ps∂zs
)
, ln
(
ηs−λ0
γ+λ0
)
and ln
(
ys
zs
)
.
The novelty of this paper is the underlying link between the term X1 and industry
volatility. The higher the industry volatility the higher the termX1 will be. The intuition
behind this relationship is based on the view that prices will be more responsive to small
changes in imports in industries that are highly volatile. In the preceding empirical
analysis, I employ a measure of industry volatility to capture this price sensitivity to
changes in imports. The term X2 is captured by a measure of industry comparative
advantage, the interaction variable between volatility and flexibility of the labor market.
The term X3 is captured by a measure of import penetration and other variables are
introduced into the empirical model to control for other possible determinants of trade
barriers.
Trefler (1993) argues that comparative advantage factors are important determinants
of trade protection. His analysis of the impact of non-tariff barriers on the U.S. imports,
that exploits endogenous trade policy theory, provide insight on various factors that
explain trade barriers. He uses a simultaneous tobit model to examine the effects of
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eliminating trade barriers between U.S. and Canada. Although, he finds measures that
capture labor market rigidities (labor union, employment size, tenure and geographical
concentration) are not significant in determining non-tariff barriers across U.S. indus-
tries, it is worthwhile to investigate if labor market rigidity is an important variable
using data for many countries. Treflers finding is a special case for the U.S. because
data across countries indicates that labor market institutional measures are important
determinants of trade barriers. Given that debates in both public and political are-
nas relates to labor market issues due to job losses in the import-competing industries,
one would expect those affected by high import penetration would lobby for trade poli-
cies that protect their interests. I find evidence, using industry-level data across many
countries (both developed and developing countries), that the interaction between la-
bor market institution (measured by the flexibility of the labor market) and industry
specific characteristic (such as industry-specific volatility) partially explain a significant
variation in trade protection.
2.5. Empirical Strategy and Model Specification
I estimate a model of trade protection that relies on protection-for-sale and other
related theoretical and empirical extensions. 2 Trade policy is determined based on
underlying industry-level factors and industries political influence. In this model the
response variable (trade protection or trade policy) is measured by industry-level tariffs
and the determinants of trade protection are used as explanatory variables.
2.5.1. Variables capturing demand for protection.
2.5.1.1. Industry volatility: There are two links through which industry-level volatility
influences trade protection. First, industries that exhibit high intrinsic volatility tend to
be prone to shocks that exacerbate fluctuations of output and income. As a result, agents
associated with these industries demand protection from policy-makers. Policy-makers
2See contributions by Baldwin 1982, Bhagwati 1982, Magee et al. 1989, Trefler 1993, Rodrick 1994, and
Lee and Swagel 1997.
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supply demanded protection to satisfy personal interests, and since it is not easy to re-
verse such policies after implementation, protection in volatile industry remain relatively
high over time. Second, volatility may influence trade protection from a comparative
advantage perspective whereby volatility interacts with flexibility of the labor market.
This interaction is explained below under comparative advantage variables.
2.5.1.2. Import penetration: Import penetration is defined as gross import divided by
domestic consumption. Domestic consumption is calculated as the sum of domestic
production and net imports. Endogenous trade policy theory predicts private domestic
agents respond to higher import competition by intensifying their lobbying for protec-
tion. Essentially demand for protection rises when industry is increasingly facing import
competition. Policy makers respond by supplying protection to maximize their political
gains.
2.5.1.3. Share of industry export in gross output: Agents associated with industries
that serve both domestic and international market may hesitate to lobby for protection
fearing retaliation. If export share of their production is significantly high then agents
weigh gains from protecting domestic market and potential loss of the export market if
the trading partners retaliate.
2.5.2. Comparative advantage variables.
2.5.2.1. Interaction of volatility and labor flexibility: If labor market is flexible then it is
expected volatile industries will have relatively less protection because flexibility confers
comparative advantage in volatile industries. Volatility interacts with labor flexibility
to course a Ricardian type of comparative advantage in the sense articulated by Cunat
and Melitz (2009). Labor market flexibility in this case refers to the ease of reallocation
of workers and jobs within industries in a country. Di Tella and MacCulloch (2005)
assert that labor regulations that increase the costs of hiring and firing, as well as gener-
ous welfare state that protects the unemployed are behind the differential labor market
performances, for example, within the OECD. The World Bank data on labor market
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flexibility show that within OECD most of the continental Europe has more rigid labor
market compared to North America, the British Isles and Oceania. Labor market flex-
ibility varies both across developed and developing countries. Two views emerge from
a quick survey of the broad literature on labor market flexibility. One relates to the
adjustment of the labor market to periodic shocks and this adjustment is realized via
a combination of adjustments in wages, labor supply and labor demand. This process
of adjustment in the presence of shocks involves rapid reallocation of labor across in-
dustries, regions and jobs or occupations, ensuring that any disturbance to the labor
market is not prolonged. The second view relates to the institutional factors that de-
termine the structural level of unemployment, that is, unemployment related to sectoral
shifts. Higher flexibility of the labor market is characterized by high employment and
low structural unemployment rates. The view of flexibility considered in this study is
flexibility defined by the variation on the speed of reallocation of labor across industries.
Measures of the flexibility of the labor market are therefore broadly associated with
important cross-country differences in the flow of workers across occupations. These
differences can be explained by labor market regulations, but also by specific industrial
responses to productivity and demand shocks. It is this flexibility that interacts with
industry-specific volatility to influence demand for trade barriers. Essentially a coun-
try with very flexible labor market tends to have comparative advantage in industries
exhibiting high intrinsic volatility.
2.5.3. Political importance.
2.5.3.1. Share of industry value added: To account for the believe that political influence
of the industry is likely to be an important determinant of trade protection share of each
industry value added is used as a proxy for industry size.
2.5.3.2. Share of industry labor: Labor share of the industry is another proxy used to
capture the political influence of the industry. Grossman and Helpman (1994) show that
price elasticity of demand for domestic products and price elasticity of supply of foreign
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products would affect the level of trade barriers because welfare losses and gains resulting
from imposition of trade barriers depend on these elasticities. Since data on elasticities
is not available, industry fixed effects are included to remedy for these industry specific
factors. In addition, to account for country specific effects such as differences in the
overall trade regime I include country specific effects.
2.5.4. Trade protection equation: I estimate the following baseline equation using
industry-level data, 28 manufacturing industries, for many countries.
TRcj = α0 + α1V OLcj + α2V OLj ∗ FLEXc + α3MPPcj +
α4EXPV ARcj + α5V ADDcj + α6LABScj + cj
where the subscripts c and j, respectively, represent country and industry. The depen-
dent variable, TR, denotes trade protection. Explanatory variables V OL, MPP and
EXPV AR represents, respectively, a measure of volatility, a measure of import pene-
tration and a measure of export share in gross out. Import penetration is calculated by
dividing gross imports by domestic consumption. The interaction variable of industry
specific-volatility and flexibility of the labor market is represented by V OL ∗ FLEX
. Note that I distinguish between measure of volatility that is specific to the industry
and country, and one that is specific to industry. Other control variables, LABS and
V ADD, denotes labor share of the industry and value added per worker, respectively.
The value added per worker is a measure of labor productivity for the industry.
2.6. Description of Data and Variables
The sources of data include World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) database, a
data set prepared by Nicita and Olarreaga (2006), Penn World Table database and Doing
Business database. In particular, country-level measures of labor market flexibility are
from World Bank development indicators (WDI) database and Doing Business database.
Other country-level variables are from the Penn World Tables database. Nicita and
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Olarreaga constructed the industry-level data on production and trade protection. This
data set is available on the World Bank database. I use data for 28 manufacturing
industries and 68 countries. I average the data over the period 1995 2004 to take care
of annual fluctuations.
As explained earlier high volatility generates demand for protection. The intuition is
straightforward. Industries that exhibit high volatility tend to be prone to both domestic
and external shocks. When agents experience increasing volatility they increase lobby-
ing activity demanding protection from policymakers. It is expected volatility would
be positively related to trade barriers after controlling for other determinants of trade
barriers. In constructing measures of volatility, I distinguish between global industry-
specific shocks and country-industry-specific shocks. Let gcjt be the deviations in growth
of value added in country c and industry j at year t. The global industry-specific shock,
vjt, is measured as the cross-country average of gcjt in each of the industries as shown
in the following equation.
vjt =
1
C
c∑
c=1
(gcjt) (35)
In the empirical estimation, vjt is averaged over the period and then used as a proxy
for industry-specific volatility. To estimate a country-industry-specific volatility, first,
country-specific disturbance are considered to be the within-country average of gcjt given
by equation (37).
ψct =
1
J
J∑
j=1
(gcjt − vjt) (36)
Then, the country-industry-specific volatility is specified as the difference between gcjt
and the two shocks as shown in the following equations.
vcjt = gcjt − vjt− ψct (37)
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The first explanatory variable on the baseline equation is constructed by averaging vcjt
over the period 1995-2004. The second explanatory variable (interaction variable) is
an interaction between (averaged over the period) and flexibility variable (FLEX). As
pointed out earlier, interaction between industry-specific volatility and flexibility of the
labor market is a source of comparative advantage and thus influence trade barriers. The
idea is that industries that have comparative advantage would want tariffs eliminated to
avoid possible retaliatory protection, by the trading partners, which would limit access
to international markets.
Rigidity of employment index, reported by World Bank for most countries, is used to
measure labor market flexibility. This index is an average of three indexes: cost of hiring
index, cost of firing index, and rigidity of working-hours index. 3 The index ranges from
0 to 100, with higher values indicating more rigid regulations. This index is subtracted
from 100 and then converted to logarithmic form to produce a measure of labor market
flexibility variable.
Other industry-level exogenous variables are; import penetration MPP , share of ex-
port in gross output EXPV AR, value added per worker V ADD, and industry labor
share LABS. Import penetration captures demand for protection. It is estimated as
industry-level gross imports divided by domestic consumption, where domestic consump-
tion is calculated as industry-level domestic production plus net imports (net import
equals imports minus exports).
Export share of gross output captures demand for protection. This variable is con-
structed as the industry-level of exports divided by industry output. Value added per
worker (V ADD) is a proxy for labor productivity and is calculated as value added of the
industry, divided by the total number of employee in the industry. Industrys labor share
(LABS) is a proxy capturing political importance of the industry. Labor share is calcu-
lated as the number of employee in the industry divided by total number of employees
3Botero et al (2004) uses other indexes (such as employment law index, collective relations laws index
and social security laws index) to measure institutional differences across countries. However in this
study, other indexes are used only for robustness checks.
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in the manufacturing industries. All variables are transformed into log form such that a
percentage change on any explanatory variable leads to some percentage change of the
response variable.
The estimated coefficient α1, in baseline equation is expected to be positive. This
implies that a country prone to high volatility will demand higher protection all else
equal. This is because agents associated with industries that are prone to volatility
intensify their lobbying activity for protection form policymakers. Volatility also in-
fluences trade protection by interacting with labor flexibility. The interaction variable
captures a source of comparative advantage of the industry. Estimated coefficient, α2,
is therefore expected to be negative. This implies that increasing flexibility of the labor
market reduces protection in comparative advantage industries. Countries with flexible
labor market tend to have comparative advantage in industries that exhibit high in-
trinsic volatility. And, according to the theory of endogenous trade policy, comparative
advantage industries rarely demand for protection because they are already competitive
in the global market.
Increasing import penetration raises the demand for more protection and that means
α3 is expected to be positive. On the other hand, retaliation, by other nations, targeting
domestic export industries may lower the demand for protection. It is therefore impor-
tant to control for industry share of exports. The effect of the change in the share of
export, α4, is expected to be negative. Increasing the share of exports in the output
of each industry lowers trade barriers. The political power of the industry is likely to
be important. To control for the political power of the industry within the country, the
industry share of labor within a country is used to capture industry size. Industries that
are of significant size exert more political pressure. As a result, industry labor share is
expected to have a positive relationship with trade protection. Likewise, the effect of
the share of value added per work is expected to be positive.
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2.7. Discussion of Estimated Results
Table 1 shows estimation of the trade protection model with industry fixed effects.
Estimated parameters on volatility and the interaction between volatility and flexibility
have the expected signs and are statistically significant. These results hold for all four
measures of trade protection including simple average tariffs, weighted tariffs, applied
tariff for Most Favored Nation (MFN) as well as the weighted MFN tariffs. Table 7,
column 2 and 3 indicates that a unit percentage change on industry volatility results
to about 9 percent change in average tariffs and weighted tariffs, from the initial tariffs
levels, holding other determinants of trade barriers constant. 4 Column 4 and 5 denotes
estimated values when tariffs are average MFN and weighted MFN respectively. For the
two categories of tariffs the estimated values imply that a 1 percent change in industry
volatility, courses 8 percent change in the level of tariffs. Estimates, on the interaction
variable, are statistically significant and with the expected negative sign. The negative
sign on the estimated parameters imply a push to lower tariffs in volatile industries when
the labor market is flexible, or alternatively a push to increase tariffs in volatile industries
as labor market become more rigid. This is consistent with the prediction of the theory
of endogenous trade policy determination. If flexibility courses some form of comparative
advantage for the more volatile industry then interested agents in these industries will
lobby for lower barriers to mitigate retaliatory from their trading partners. It is therefore
the case that when the labor market is made more flexible, say by eliminating excessive
labor regulations and encouraging flow of jobs and workers, trade barriers are likely to
fall in industries that exhibit high intrinsic volatility.
The share of imports to domestic consumption is positively related to tariff barriers.
Estimated values, on import penetration, are statistically significant at 1 percent con-
fidence interval. If imports share increases by 1 percent, it is likely to increases tariff
barriers by 0.3 percent from the original level. Greater import penetration could raise
4The 9 percent change in average tariffs should not be mistaken to mean percentage point change in
tariffs. Since tariffs are reported in percentages and they were transformed to log form, estimated values
must be interpreted as a percentage changes from the initial tariffs levels.
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trade barriers because domestic private interest tends to demand more protection as
import penetration increases. However, the magnitude of the estimated coefficient is
very small. Table 8 presents estimated values for country fixed effects. The signs and
magnitudes of estimated coefficients do not change significantly. However, estimates on
trade protection equations with industry and country fixed effects presented in table 9,
indicates significant changes in the size of parameters.
2.8. Concluding Remarks
This empirical study add to the existing literature on the relationship between volatil-
ity and international trade. It exploits the theory of endogenous determination of trade
policy to establish the link between volatility and trade protection. I find that volatility
is an important source of demand for protection. As volatility of the industry increases,
lobbying activity for protection intensifies and as a result industries exhibiting high
volatility receive higher protection from politicians. In addition, labor market flexibil-
ity generate comparative advantage towards industries that are volatile. 5 This effect
reduces demand for protection. Consistent with the theory of endogenous trade policy,
comparative advantage industries receive less protection. This implies that volatile in-
dustries may not lobby for protection if the labor market is sufficiently flexible to course
comparative advantage in those industries. The interaction effect thus minimizes the
demand for protection.
5This type of comparative advantage coursed by flexibility of the labor market is well articulated by
Cunat and Melitz (2009)
38
Chapter 3
International Trade, Labor Market Flexibility, and Unemployment:
empirical evidence from less developed countries
3.1. Introduction
Despite unemployment being one of the major economic issues in the public and
political discourse on the effects of globalization, trade economists have generally tended
to abstract away from unemployment. Studies examining relationship between trade and
unemployment are more often confined on the periphery of mainstream trade literature.
Only recently, trade economists have incorporated differences in labor market institutions
and unemployment into the mainstream trade models.
In a nutshell, the new models, that incorporate labor rigidities and unemployment,
suggest that increased exposure to international trade play an important role in the
determination of unemployment. However, the effect of increased exposure to interna-
tional trade on unemployment is either negative in some theoretical models or positive
in others. For example, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) find that unemployment rates
in flexible countries (having less labor rigidities) depend on the pervasiveness of trade
impediments and the level of labor market frictions. Helpman and Itskhoki conclude
that disparity in labor market frictions and the interaction between trade barriers and
labor market institutions create rich patterns of unemployment.
Several theoretical studies that introduce labor rigidities into the Ricardian and Heckscher-
Ohlin comparative advantage models conclude that trade openness matters for the equi-
librium rate of unemployment. However, in some cases openness is negatively related
to unemployment while in other cases the relationship is positive. For example, David-
son et al. (1988, 1999) incorporate frictional unemployment in models of comparative
advantage and find that the sign of the relationship between trade openness and unem-
ployment depends on a comparison of capital-labor endowments across countries. Egger
and Kreickemeier (2009) introduce fair wages into a model with increasing returns to
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scale and find that openness can increase unemployment. Felbermayr et al. (2011) in-
troduce a standard Pissarides (2000) search model into a model with increasing return
to scale and find that unemployment decrease with increased openness. To this end
theoretical literature suggests there is no consensus on the long-run effects of increased
international exchange on unemployment, which calls for empirical assessment to ascer-
tain if trade openness lowers, raises or has no effect on unemployment. In addition, it
is not well known how labor market institutions interact with trade policy to influences
unemployment.
The main objective of this paper is to empirically examine the effects of trade policy
and labor market flexibility on unemployment across developing countries (low income
and lower middle income countries, based on the World Bank classifications). Focusing
on developing countries is important because previous studies have mainly analyzed
effects of trade policy and labor flexibility in relation to developed OECD countries. In
addition, empirical studies that examine the effects of trade policy and labor flexibility
are limited despite the fact that these issues are very common in the public and political
debates. I examine the effects of trade policy and labor flexibility on unemployment for
two categories of unemployed. The first category is the unemployment rate for those
people with primary education (considered less skilled category), and the second category
is the unemployment rate for those with secondary education (considered more skilled
category), across developing countries.
3.2. Exposure to international trade
As the world continues to experience increased exposure to international trade a sig-
nificant portion of the public feel that this trend generates forces that threaten job
security. However, inside the economic profession exposure to international trade, for
most part, is beneficial because it provides necessary environment for job creation. Exist-
ing literature has attempted to shed light on these differing views on the effects of trade
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openness on unemployment. According to Bernard et al. (2007) openness to trade in-
creases job turnover as workers move from diminishing uncompetitive industries to the
more productive expanding industries. Some studies support the view that frictional
unemployment, at the aggregate level, increases due to adjustments of workers across
industries. For example, Trefler (2004) documents that for NAFTA (North American
Free Trade Agreement) worker reallocation temporarily raised unemployment.
Using the Ricardian comparative advantage model (based on relative technological
differences) and Heckscher-Ohlin comparative advantage model (based on international
differences in relative factor endowments), Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (2009), henceforth
DMR, find that trade openness is negatively related to unemployment in the Ricardian
comparative advantage model, but has no significant effect in the Heckscher-Ohlin com-
parative advantage model. According to Felbermayr, Prat and Schmerer (2011) in the
long run, openness to trade is negatively related to the structural rate of unemployment.
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) also find that trade openness can increase unemployment.
There is more literature that is broadly related to trade openness and the dynamics
in the labor market. For example, Egger and Kreickemeier (2008) examine how inter-
national fragmentation affects unemployment and wage inequality in an open economy
model with efficiency wages. Koskela and Stenbacka (2010) find that outsourcing has a
different effect on high-skill and low-skill workers, and that overall rate of unemployment
decreases in outsourcing if the high skill worker force is relatively small.
On the relationship between differences in labor market institutions and unemploy-
ment it is commonly believed that continental Europe suffers from rigidities in the labor
markets and this exacerbates unemployment problems and labor participation compared
to North America that has relatively less rigid labor market. 1 However, Nickell (1997)
doubts the importance of the differences in labor market rigidity as determinants of un-
employment. The author argues that some of the features of the labor markets that are
1Botero et al. (2004) emphasizes the view that high rigidity of the labor market is partly attributed to
pervasive regulations of the labor market. The authors find heavier regulation of labor reduces labor
force participation and causes high unemployment.
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referred rigidities in some European countries do not cause high unemployment. In a
more recent work Nickell et al (2005) show that the evolution of labor market institutions
partially explain unemployment rates.
The state of theoretical literature, on the effects of trade openness and labor flexibility
on unemployment, points towards an empirical assessment. An empirical analysis that
incorporates both trade policy and labor flexibility is necessary because, as suggested by
Helpman and Itskhoki (2010), unemployment rate depends on interactions between trade
impediments and labor market flexibility. In addition, both theoretical and empirical
models that examine, separately, the effects of trade openness and labor flexibility have
not arrived to a consensus on how these variables influence unemployment. Davidson
and Matusz (2004) argue that whether trade openness affect the level of equilibrium
unemployment depends on empirical evidence. Existing empirical studies on the effects
of trade policy and labor flexibility mainly focus on developed countries, those that
belong to the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Yet
trade impediments (measured by tariffs rates) are more pervasive among less developed
countries than among OECD countries, but have received less attention. Moreover, un-
employment rates are much higher across less developed countries compared to developed
countries.
In view of these differing findings on the relationships between labor market institu-
tions and unemployment, and the fact that empirical analysis on the impact of trade
impediments and differences in the labor market institutions on unemployment are lim-
ited an empirical study that creates a deeper insight on these relationships is important.
3.3. Theoretical framework
I estimate a baseline equation derived from the Dutt, Mitra and Ranjan (DMR) model
of trade and unemployment. I present a summary of the DMR model to bring forth the
underlying intuition upon which my empirical model is built. DMR model assumes a
production structure in a two-sector economy, and trade that is based on a Ricardian
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comparative advantage. The model assumes an economy that produces a non-tradable
final good, Z, and two tradable intermediate goods, X and Y . The production function
for the final good is as follows:
Z =
[
TXβ−1Y β
] [
ββ(1− β)1−β
]−1
(38)
where, 0 < β < 1. Let the prices of X and Y in terms of the final good be represented by
Px and Py respectively. The unit cost for producing the final good is denoted as follows:
c(Px, Py) =
1
T
(Px)
1−β(Py)β (39)
This cost function can be equated to unit because the final good is chosen as the
numeraire. Equation 39 above can be written as follows:
1
T
(Px)
1−β(Py)β = 1 (40)
Relative demand for the two intermediate goods is denoted as follows.
Xd
Y d
= [(1− β)Py] [βPx]−1 (41)
The labor market is similar to a standard Pissarides (2000) search model that is
embedded in the two-sector economy. Idiosyncratic shock on the productivity of existing
job-worker matches leads to job destruction. A firm rents capital to produce intermediate
goods once a job-worker much is created. It is assumed that the firm can return the
capital to the owner upon destruction of a job. Let the firms production functions in
the two intermediate sectors be denoted as follows.
x = axk
nx
x
y = ayk
ny
y
0 ≤ ni ≤ 1
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where ki denotes the amount of capital used in sector i = x, y, ni is a parameter that
captures capital intensity and ai is a sector technology parameter capturing total factor
productivity. Let Li denote workers affiliated with sector i and ui represents unemploy-
ment rate in sector i . It follows that the number of employed in the sector i is given by
Li(1− ui).
Aggregate production functions in sectors X and Y are denoted the following equa-
tions.
X = Lx(1− ux)axknxx (42)
Y = Ly(1− uy)ayknyy (43)
The amount of capital in each sector is represented as follows. Kx = kiL− x(1− ux);
Ky = kyLy(1− uy). Given that the labor constraint is binding, such that L = Lx + Ly,
then the market clearing condition in the capital market is captured by the following
equation:
K = Lxkx(1− ux) + Lyky(1− uy) (44)
Equation 8, derived from equations 5 and 6, captures relative supply of the two inter-
mediate goods.
ax(1− ux)Lxknxx
ay(1− uy)Lyknyy
=
Xs
Y s
(45)
3.3.1. Labor Market: In the labor market the following matching function represents
the flow of matches in each sector per unit time.
Mi(viLi, uiLi) = miv
α
i u
1−α
i Li = miφ
α
i uiLi, 0 < α < 1 (46)
where vi, denotes vacancy rate, φ =
vi
ui
captures market tightness, mi represents a scale
parameter in the matching function and the parameter α denotes the vacancy intensity of
the above Cobb-Douglas vacancy-worker matching function. The rates at which vacant
jobs are filled and workers exit from unemployment are captured by expressions 47 and
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48.
Mi
viLi
= miφ
α−1
i (47)
Mi
uiLi
= miφ
α
i (48)
If the matches in sector i, are destroyed at a rate of θi per period, then the net flow
into unemployment is given by the following equation:
ui = θ(1− ui)−miθαi ui (49)
The steady-state rate of unemployment, in sector i, is a constant denoted as follows:
ui =
θi
θi +miφαi
(50)
The Bellman’s equation below denotes the asset value of a vacant job, Vi.
ρVi = −λi +miφα−1i (Ji − Vi) (51)
The parameters, λi, denotes the cost of hiring in terms of final good, ρ represents an
exogenous discount factor, and Ji is the value of a filled vacancy. Assuming free entry
in job creation, that is, Vi = 0, then the value of the filled vacancy is given as follows:
Ji =
λi
miφ
α−1
i
(52)
where i = X,Y .
The asset value of an occupied vacancy satisfies the following Bellman’s equation:
ρJi = piaik
ni
i − rki − wi − θJi, (53)
where r denotes rental cost of capital and wi is the wage in terms of numeraire good.
The zero profit condition, expression 54, is derived from equations 52 and 53.
(ρ+ θi)λi
miφ
α−1
i
= piaik
ni
i − rki − wi (54)
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The maximization of the objective function, equation 53, at given wage and rental
rates gives the following optimal choice of ki:
piainik
ni−1
i = r (55)
The wage is determined through a process of Nash bargaining between the worker
and employer. The value of a job for an employer is given by Ji and the surplus from
the job is Wi − Ui, where Wi is the discounted present value of employment in sector i.
The term Ui denotes the value of unemployment. The Bellman equations governing Wi
and Ui are given by equation 56 and 57 below.
wi + θ(Ui −Wi) = ρWi (56)
b+miφ
α
i (Wi − Ui) = ρUi (57)
The term b, represents a flow of some form of benefits (for example, unemployment
insurance), in terms of final goods, transferred to the unemployed workers in each sector.
The Nash bargaining gives the following expression:
Ji(
σ
1− σ ) = Wi − Ui (58)
where σ, captures the bargaining power of workers. Equations 52, 56 and 57 leads to
the following equation:
ρUi = b+ (
σ
1− σ )miφ
α
i Ji = b+ (
α
1− αλiφi (59)
Equation 60 denotes the value of the wage and it is derived by substituting out Wi,
Ji and ρUi .
wi = σ(piaik
ni
i − rki + λiφi) + (1− σ)b (60)
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Assuming no arbitrage condition, such that Ux = Uy, then the equilibrium condition
is given as follows:
λxφx = λyφy (61)
Assuming further that mx = my, λx = λy, θx = θy and wx = wy implies search
parameters are symmetric across sectors X and Y . Since λx = λy, then from equation
24, φx = φy. It also follows that equations 54 and 60 gives the wage expression:
wi =
(
λiφi +
(ρ+ θi)λi
miφ
α−1
i
)
σ
1− σ + b (62)
It can be shown, using the wage equation 62, that for a given price ratio, increasing
the value of λ, σ or b reduces φ causing unemployment to increase. I use an index for
labor market rigidity to capture the effects of σ and b on the empirical model.
In this Ricardian comparative advantage formulation, factor intensities are also as-
sumed to be identical in both sectors X and Y , which implies the difference between
the two production functions, for the two sectors, is a constant productivity term ai.
Given the assumptions of identical factor intensities and symmetric search parameters,
equations 54 and 55 yield the following expression:
pxaxk
n
x − npxaxknx = pyaykny − npyaykny (63)
Equations 55 and 63 are used to derive the result that satisfy the following relative
price equation:
Px
Py
=
ay
ax
(64)
Assuming that sector X is the comparative advantage sector, before opening up to
trade, the world price exceeds the price of sector X. Therefore the relative prices can
be denoted as follows: (
px
py
)A
<
(
px
py
)W
(65)
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where superscript A and W , respectively, denotes autarky and world. Moving from
autarky to free trade the relative price of X increases to equal the world relative price,
such that Pxax > pyay. This means, from equation 18, the expression axpxk
n
x > aypyk
n
y
holds, also because kx > ky. Since rigidities in the labor market are identical for both
sectors, Nash bargaining would equate wages for the two sectors. However, the compar-
ative disadvantage sector Y shrinks because axpxk
n
x = wx +
(ρ+θ)λ
mφσ−1 > aypyk
n
y . Therefore
the country fully specializes in the comparative advantage sector X.
When the economy opens up for trade the unemployment falls because an increase in
relative prices implies that px increases and py decreases. As a result, jobs are profitable
in the comparative advantage sector at the existing autarky wage and for a given param-
eter φ. On the other hand, in sector Y , the comparative disadvantage sector, jobs are
not profitable given the lower py. To sum up the intuition of the trade-unemployment
model; starting from autarky price, px and φ increases causing the wage, w, to increase
and unemployment, u, to fall. The theoretical model indicates that trade liberalization
or reduction of trade barriers would cause unemployment rate to fall. The intuition in
this model is the basis upon which the baseline equation, 29, is formulated. On empirical
examination, using equation 29, for the sample of less developed countries, I find that
the effect of trade liberalization on unemployment vary for skilled and unskilled labor
force.
3.4. Unemployment and the Flexibility of Labor Market.
Since the paper focuses on both the effects of trade policy and labor market insti-
tutions on unemployment among skilled and unskilled labor force across a sample of
less developed countries, it is vital to examine the definition and interpretation of labor
market flexibility and the proxy that is used to capture this variable.
In a broader perspective, flexibility of the labor market relates to the mobility jobs
and workers. Differences in mobility of workers, both geographically and between jobs
are, for most part, attributed to labor laws and regulations that constitute differences
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of labor market institutions. Botero et al. (2004) constructed indices to capture these
institutional differences for many countries by coding many laws and regulations that
govern firm-worker employment contracts, dismissal procedures, hiring procedures and
changes in hours worked. The index on rigidity of employment reported on the World
Bank database (WDI database) is constructed following the formulation used by Botero
et al. (2004). This rigidity of employment index is used in this paper to capture flexibility
of the labor market. The index takes into account various regulatory practices governing
firms in hiring and firing of workers in addition to other labor laws enshrined in a country
legal system. The index is an average of four indices; an index capturing the cost of firing
workers, an index capturing the cost of increasing hours worked, an index capturing
alternative employment contracts and an index that measures other dismissal laws.
3.5. Data Description and the Model.
The estimated model assumes that trade occurs due to Ricardian comparative ad-
vantage described and unemployment results from search or ’congestion’ externalities
as in the standard Pissarides (2000) search model. If trade takes place only as a re-
sult of Ricardian type of comparative advantage then reducing trade barriers reduces
unemployment. Opening up the economy for trade increases the value of the marginal
product of labor in sector (this is the more productive sector and consequently the ex-
port sector) due to an increase in the domestic relative price of good produced in the
sector. In this Ricardian set up trade leads to complete specialization, thus sector (the
sector experiencing import competition), where the value of marginal product of labor
would have been lower, shrinks under free trade such that the economy wide value of
marginal product of labor increases. Workers and employers invest more in job search
and job posting, and this leads to lower unemployment. I introduce labor market flexi-
bility in the model consistent with the arguments by Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) that
interactions of labor flexibility and trade policy are important in the determination of
long term unemployment.
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Using country level data over the period 2000-2009 across 78 countries, I estimate a
reduced equation with unemployment rate as the dependent variable and trade imped-
iment, and labor market flexibility as the main explanatory variables. All variables are
averaged over the period 2000-2009 in order to net out business cycle effects although
controlling for output also minimizes the effects of business cycles.
I consider two categories of unemployment, unemployment rate as a percentage of
labor force with primary education (considered less skilled category) and unemployment
rate as a percentage of labor force with secondary education (considered as skilled cat-
egory). Weighted tariffs are used to capture trade policy although real openness is also
used for robustness. To capture labor market flexibility, I use measures of rigidity of
employment indices constructed by Botero et al. (2004).
I estimate the following model for a sample of 57 less developed countries.
UN = α0 + α1TARIFF + α2FLEXV AR+ α3OUTPUTV OL+ α4POP1564 + 
Average tariff rates are used to capture trade impediments but other measures of
trade impediments are used to check for robustness. 2Rigidity of employment index is
used to proxy for labor market flexibility. Rigidity of employment index is an average
of three indices, cost of hiring index, cost of firing and rigidity of work hours developed
by Botero et al. (2004). This index captures important cross-country differences in the
flow of workers and jobs across occupations.
3.5.1. Control variables. To control for the effects of short run fluctuations, a mea-
sure of output volatility is used. Following Ramey and Ramey (1995), countries with high
volatility have lower growth and high unemployment. Output volatility is measured as
the standard deviation of annual GDP per capita growth (measured as year-differenced
log GDP per capita) for each country in the sample over the period 2000-2009. The
2There are many protectionist policy instruments used by countries (for example, antidumping duties,
quotas, non-automatic licensing, tariffs, etc.) such that it is not easy to find a single measure that
captures all trade policy instruments. As a result of this limitation, real openness,Ropen = 2 Importsc
pppGDPc
,
is used as a measure of trade impediments for robustness checks.
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effects of the size of the economy could be important in the determination of long-term
unemployment. Real GDP and the working-age population (ages 15 to 64 years) are
used to control for the effects of economy size. These two controls for the size of the
economy also controls for the level of development. A variable indicating existence of
minimum wage is included as a labor market covariate. To control for the trade-offs
between inflation and unemployment, I include nominal interest rate and inflation rate
as additional controls. These two controls are added based on the understanding that
monetary policy is frequently used as a tool to manage the trade-offs between inflation
and unemployment. Inclusion of these control variables in the estimated equation does
not alter either the signs or the magnitudes of estimated coefficients on tariff or labor
flexibility.
3.5.2. Endogeneity of trade policy and instrumental variable estimation.
Policymakers in countries experiencing high unemployment could experience pressure
from lobbies and industries most affected to impose trade barriers if affected industries
believe imports course unemployment. There is potential reserve causality where by
increasing unemployment could influence trade policy. This problem can be mitigated
by use of a valid instrument for trade policy. Two instrumental variables that can be
used include average bilateral distance of a countrys trading partners and the number of
years a country stays outside WTO (World Trade Organization) or its predecessor GATT
(General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) since its inception in 1948. The remoteness
of a countrys trading partners could generate an incentive to set low tariffs in order to
lower cost of import. Ross (2004) finds that nearly all countries lowered their tariffs
barriers significantly after acceding to GATT. After accession to GATT countries took
about 10 years on average to open up their economies. So the degree of protectionism
is positively related to the duration a country stays outside GATT.
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3.6. Estimated results
Table 11 shows results from OLS estimation with only the trade policy covariates.
The coefficient estimate on average tariff rate is positive in the first equation (UN1)
unemployment rate as a percentage of labor force with primary education. This pos-
itive relationship is consistent to the predictions in the theory that increase in trade
barriers could increase unemployment. However, it is not possible at this point to make
inference on the magnitude of this estimate with other control variables excluded. The
variable capturing trade policy (measure of real openness) has a negative relationship
with the first category of unemployment (UN1), as expected. For the second category of
unemployment rate UN2, (unemployment as a percentage of labor force with secondary
education) the coefficient estimates on tariff and real openness are negative and posi-
tive respectively. This implies that an increase in tariff barriers lowers UN2 category of
unemployment. Table 12 presents negative relationships between labor flexibility unem-
ployment. This signals that making labor market more flexible (say by lowering the cost
of hiring and firing, increasing flexibility of work hours) could lower both categories of
unemployment.
Table 13 shows both OLS and IV estimates with all control variables included. The
signs on the estimates for both trade policy and labor flexibility do not change. However,
the magnitudes change significantly. Column 2 (OLS estimates) indicates that a 1percent
increase in tariffs decreases the first category of unemployment (UN1) by 0.35 percent
and the estimate is significant at 1percent confidence interval. The effect of flexibility is
negative and statistically significant at 5 percent confidence interval. The IV estimates
for tariffs and flexibility presented on column 3 have the expected sign and are significant
at 10 percent and 5 percent confidence intervals respectively. The magnitudes for the IV
estimates are higher than the OLS but are weakly significant. The p-value reported from
Hansen-Sargan tests could not reject the null hypothesis of over-identifying restrictions,
which confirms the instruments used are valid. Columns 4 and 5, present OLS and
IV estimates for the second category of unemployment (UN2). Tariffs and flexibility
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partially explain unemployment (UN2). However, the sign on the coefficient estimate
on tariffs is inverted. It means that an increase in tariffs decreases this category of
unemployment.
3.7. Concluding Remarks
Trade barriers and rigidities in the labor market exacerbate unemployment in devel-
oping countries. However, increases in tariffs have difference effects among the unskilled
and skilled workers. Increasing tariffs increases unemployment among relatively unskilled
workers while it lowers unemployment among relatively skilled workers. The effects of
tariffs on unemployment are robust even after controlling for the size of the economy
and the effects of business cycles. Instrumental variable estimates (IV) reveal that en-
dogeneity of trade policy and unemployment leads to underestimation of the effects of
trade policy on long-term unemployment. These findings suggest trade policy influences
unemployment in the sample of less developed countries, and this is consistent with the
Ricardian predictions. However, this is true only for unemployment among the relatively
unskilled workers. Ricardian predictions are inverted for unemployment among relatively
skilled workers. The varying effects of trade policy on different skill category could be
reconciled by the infant-industry protection argument pioneered by John Stuart Mill in
the 19th century. The infant industry argument asserts that protecting infant industries
during the learning process until they mature and become competitive could increase
welfare. Given this argument, if the relatively skilled workers are primarily associated
with infant industries (industries that are maturing by learning new external technolo-
gies) then increasing tariffs protects these industries from external competition. When
these industries mature, productivity improves thus hiring more skilled workers and
lowering unemployment among this category of workers. More recently, Melitz (2005)
develop a theoretical model on infant industry protection. He shows that tariffs could
actually increase welfare when industries are protected during the process of learning
new external technologies.
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Figure 1. Correlation between log GDP and labor flexibility index for
many countries, both developed and less developed.
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Figure 2. Correlation between log GDP and labor flexibility index for
developed countries.
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Figure 3. Correlation between log GDP and labor flexibility index for
less developed countries.
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Figure 4. Correlation between trade (exports plus imports divided by
output) and volatility.
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Figure 5. Relationships between tariffs and volatility of value added.
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Figure 6. Correlation between unemployment rate and tariff rate (sim-
ple MFN tariff rate.
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Figure 7. Correlation between unemployment and labor flexibility.
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Table 1. Values of labor index constructed by Botero et al. (2004) and
GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2000 US dollars), averages for the period
1994-2004.
Country GDP per capita Labor Flexibility Index
Japan 36467.1 0.163937
Norway 36104.5 0.685338
Switzerland 33701.4 0.452044
United States 33431 0.217594
Denmark 28744.4 0.572687
Sweden 26507.4 0.740487
United Kingdom 24033.8 0.282408
Ireland 23049.4 0.342714
Netherlands 22830.9 0.725569
Austria 22829.8 0.500656
Singapore 22690.8 0.311639
Canada 22380.1 0.261536
Germany 22238.7 0.701526
Finland 22151.5 0.736604
Belgium 21733.9 0.513275
France 20988.7 0.744279
Australia 20904.3 0.3515
Italy 18754.8 0.649927
Israel 18568.2 0.289014
Spain 13707 0.744681
New Zealand 13249.9 0.160721
Greece 11209 0.518858
Portugal 10744.7 0.808767
Slovenia 9604.43 0.735911
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Table 5. Estimated results with industry and country fixed effects
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES
V OLj ∗ FLEXc 0.621*** 0.236*** 0.389***
(0.190) (0.0732) (0.141)
Kcj ∗ FLEXc -0.0652*** -0.0479 1.062***
(0.0177) (0.150) (0.278)
Kcj ∗Kc 0.0191*** 0.251* 1.042***
(0.00295) (0.147) (0.287)
Observations 1,495 1,495 1,495
R-squared 0.37 0.21 0.341
µj Yes No Yes
ϕc No Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
68
Table 6. A Probit estimation
(1) (2) (3)
EQUATION VARIABLES
V OLj ∗ FLEXc 0.762*** 0.186*** 0.154***
(0.167) (0.0667) (0.0546)
Kcj ∗ FLEXc -0.0756*** -0.0954 -0.0716***
(0.0160) (0.137) (0.0160)
Kcj ∗Kc 0.0156*** 0.215 0.0147***
(0.00274) (0.135) (0.00274)
Observations 1,514 1,514 1,514
µj Yes No Yes
ϕc No Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
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